Tax mix corners and other kinks by Revelli, F.
  
 
 
This is an author version of the contribution published in: 
Questa è la versione dell’autore dell’opera pubblicata in: 
 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 56(3), 2013, pp. 741‐776  
DOI: 10.1086/671479 
  
The definitive version is available at: 
La versione definitiva è disponibile alla URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/671479 
 
Tax mix corners and other kinks
Federico Revelli∗
June 1, 2011; revised: July 19, 2012; April 3, 2013
Abstract
This paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence
of statewide fiscal limitations - the decentralized government finance archetype
- and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants (the con-
ventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed “flypaper effect”) arises in the
constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind, and can-
not in general be taken as a symptom of local government overspending. An
empirical application to Italian province panel data provides consistent evidence
of the role of corner solutions produced by two-sided tax limits in explaining
the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants.
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1 Introduction
The overall size as well as the tax revenue bundle of the local public sector
in multi-tiered structures of government are the outcomes of the decentralized
decision-making process subject to the fiscal rules set by central (state) govern-
ments. As documented by Anderson [1] and Wolman et al. [39] for the US,
and by Joumard and Kongsrud [24] and Sutherland et al. [37] for the OECD
countries, top-down tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are frequently so
tight and pervasive as to jeopardize the very principle of local fiscal autonomy.1
This paper aims at investigating how statewide revenue raising limitation
rules shape local governments’ budget constraints, focusing on the kinks that are
typically generated by tax floors and caps.2 In particular, it evaluates the effects
of tax limits on the determination of the local tax mix and on the response of
local public expenditures to grants. As far as the latter issue is concerned, a vast
literature most recently reviewed by Inman [22] has investigated and sought to
explain the anomalously high response of local spending to grants relative to the
response to private income - the so-called flypaper effect by which money from
central government “sticks where it hits.”3 Two broad kinds of explanations of
the flypaper effect have been offered in the literature (Hines and Thaler [20]).
The first has to do with a variety of specification and estimation errors that
applied researchers would have kept on making for decades. Those errors range
from mistakenly treating matching grants as if they were lump-sum, to the
omission of important variables - such as unobserved population characteristics
1Nechyba [29] argues, though, that state command on local fiscal choices (in terms of
income tax-funded grants and state-imposed caps on local property tax rates) arises in equi-
librium as an optimal outside enforcement when a collusive agreement to simultaneously
introduce local income taxes is not self-enforcing. Vigdor [38] sees statewide local tax limi-
tations as a way of allowing absentee landowners and nonresident employees to contain tax
exporting. Calabrese and Epple [8] provide a comprehensive political economy model of the
emergence of tax limits in the presence of multiple policy instruments.
2Vertical restraints - such as quantity floors and price ceilings - are ubiquitous in private
sector networks too. Zanarone [41] discusses the rich theoretical literature on vertical re-
straints as coordination mechanisms, and analyzes empirically the role of public regulation in
manufacturer-dealer contracts.
3According to Inman [22], over 3,500 research papers exist documenting and seeking to
explain the flypaper effect. Payne [30] offers an insightful wide-ranging review of the more
recent research into the mirror phenomenon of crowd-out.
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or spatial lags of other governments’ policies - that are simultaneously correlated
with grants and local public expenditures. The second explanation relies on the
argument that the political representation process is substantially richer than
the one postulated by the standard neoclassical model: asymmetric information,
loss aversion, fiscal illusion, separate mental accounting, special interest groups,
and citizens’ inability to write complete contracts with their elected officials
would be responsible for the lack of fungibility between public and private uses
of money, and would cause the observed large flypaper effect.4
I model here for the first time the local tax mix determination process in
the presence of statewide tax limitations - the decentralized government finance
archetype - and show how the so-called flypaper effect arises in the endogenously
generated constrained tax mix. In particular, local expenditures are shown to be
predicted to display a one-for-one response to grants in the presence of binding
limitations on all local tax revenue sources. Interestingly, a binding cap on
just one of the available own revenue sources is enough to generate some form
of flypaper effect, in the sense of an excess sensitivity (Flavin [14]) of local
spending to grants. Importantly, the above results hold when either upper
or lower tax limitations are binding: in fact, local authorities will display an
excess sensitivity of public expenditures to grants irrespective of whether they
are against lower or upper bounds. Finally, the reaction of local public spending
to own tax base shocks will be a function of the (lower or upper) binding tax
rate limits.
An important corollary of the analysis concerns the very interpretation of
the public spending behavior that is conventionally known as the flypaper effect.
Since excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants should be predicted
to arise - and generally tends to manifest itself - both when grants increase
and when they decrease, the depiction of grants as sticky seems semantically
dubious, and the flypaper effect label turns out to be a misleading one: an
4Building on the insights of Hamilton [17] and Becker and Mulligan [4], Dahlby [12] recently
relaunched the explanation of the flypaper effect based on the convex deadweight costs of
taxation.
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higher sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants than to own revenue
sources cannot in general be interpreted as a sinister symptom of decentralized
government overspending.
While the existing literature seems to have almost universally overlooked
the potential impact of tax and expenditure limitations on the sensitivity of lo-
cal public spending to exogenous variations in grants, some recent papers have
brought the fiscal limitations issue into the empirical investigation of the flypa-
per effect. Lutz [28] conjectures that previous evidence of a flypaper effect might
have arisen from state constraints preventing local governments from selecting
their preferred bundle of public goods, and provides evidence of equivalence be-
tween grants and income from a school finance reform in New Hampshire - “one
of only five states with no state-imposed limitations on the taxing or spending
power of local governments” (Lutz [28], p. 317). Brooks and Phillips [7] offer
the first formal statement and explicit empirical test of the hypothesis that re-
strictive fiscal institutions might be responsible for the flypaper effect. They
use data on the US Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program
and argue that state TELs may systematically force city governments to under-
provide local public goods and increase the stimulative effect of federal grants
on city spending. However, since they do not observe either the municipal tax
bundle or whether a revenue raising constraint is actually binding in any given
city, they have to rely on a state-level index of fiscal constraints and ignore
both the municipal choice as to own revenue source diversification and the is-
sue of endogenous selection of a city government into the fiscally constrained
status. Interestingly, Brooks and Phillips [7] find a generally high sensitivity of
spending to grants in a period of dramatic retrenchment, while they find only
limited evidence of an effect of statutory state-level tax limitations on munici-
pal governments’ response to the collapse in CDBG grants. Finally, Baicker [3]
analyzes US states’ responses to federally mandated increases in public medical
spending (mandated expansions in Medicaid coverage). She develops a theo-
retical model showing that states subject to binding tax limits (legal ceilings)
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would have to reduce spending on other programs by more when faced with a
mandatory spending increase than they would if they were able to raise taxes.
While her empirical analysis reveals that all states - with or without limits -
offset the mandated Medicaid increase by reducing other public welfare spend-
ing, she recognizes that this might be due to the fact that she does not observe
whether tax limits are actually binding.
The paper concludes with an empirical application to panel data on Ital-
ian provincial governments’ budgets. The econometric set-up relies on sharply
observed corner solutions produced by nationwide tax limits during the years
2000-2007, and exploits the exogenous features of state retrenchment follow-
ing Italy’s adherence to the EU Stability and Growth Pact to estimate the ef-
fect of state grants on provincial expenditures. An attractive feature of Italian
provinces is that their own tax revenue sources (a tax on vehicle registrations,
a tax on electricity consumption for business uses, and a waste management
surcharge) are subject to strict and frequently binding upper and lower tax rate
limitations. The empirical analysis based on a panel data switching regression
approach that allows for endogenous selection into the tax-constrained regime
as well as for potential grant endogeneity offers evidence of excess sensitivity
of local public spending to grants - a one-for-one response - in tax-constrained
localities, irrespective of whether upper or lower tax limits bind. On the other
hand, I show that authorities that are not fully constrained turn out to be able
to smooth out their expenditure profile by offsetting state grant policy in a pe-
riod of fiscal retrenchment through own tax changes, and that the impact of
own tax bases on local expenditures depends on whether lower or upper limits
are binding in the observed tax mix.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model for the
analysis of the local tax mix determination process in the presence of upper
and lower constraints on own tax instruments. Sections 3 develops the model’s
empirical implications and outlines the econometric strategy. Section 4 presents
the tax structure of the Italian provinces. Section 5 reports and discusses the
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switching regression estimation results, section 6 deals with grant and regime
selection endogeneity issues, and section 7 concludes.
2 Communicating vessels
Consider the two vessels in figure 1. Say that vessel vpn represents consumption
of private goods out of community n private income in (n = 1, ..., N), and vessel
vgn represents consumption of local public services. The width of the vgn vessel
relative to the vpn one can be interpreted as reflecting community n’s preferences
for publicly provided - and possibly non-rival - services versus market-provided
consumption goods.
The structure depicted in (1.a) amounts to a perfect tax centralization
arrangement, where expenditures on local public services are entirely funded
by central government grants gn. Of course, nothing ensures that the allocation
of resources to private and public uses reflects local preferences, or that the mar-
ginal benefit from private consumption equals the marginal benefit from public
consumption.
In the central picture (1.b), the two vessels are allowed to communicate via
local tax revenues. In order for local public goods to be provided optimally,
and given that the marginal rate of transformation between private and public
goods is assumed constant and equal to one, the marginal utility in the two
vessels has to be equalized. Just like communicating vessels, where the force
of gravity requires hydrostatic pressure to be balanced out in the two vessels
regardless of their relative sizes, the welfare optimization forces make resources
flow from vpn to vgn at the tax rate τn = tnin . Once the even equilibrium level
is attained in the two vessels, whether additional resources are poured into vpn
or into vgn the same allocation of private and public consumption will result by
the law of communicating vessels.
In the bottom picture (1.c), local jurisdiction n is subject to a tax rate cap
equal to h = thnin , with the cap binding if thn < tn. The Samuelson condition
for optimal public good provision will not be satisfied if the tax cap is binding,
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meaning that more resources ought to flow from vpn to vgn in order to equate
the “pressure” in the two vessels. An additional unit of private income will raise
the consumption level at rate 1−h in vpn, and at the rate h in vgn. If additional
grants are poured into (pumped out of) vgn, the level will rise (fall) in vgn only.
The flypaper effect, so to say.
2.1 The one-tax case
Let the welfare of lower-tier jurisdiction n (n = 1, ..., N) in a two-tier structure of
government be expressed as a separable, concave function of public and private
goods consumption:
wn = v(zn) + ρnu(cn) = ln(zn) + ρn ln(in(1− τn)) (1)
where zn stands for expenditure on local public services, in is some meaningful
measure of community income, τn is the flat local income tax rate, and ρn is a
(positive) parameter reflecting preferences for private consumption versus con-
sumption of local public services, and let local authority n abide to a balanced
budget rule:
zn = gn + τnin (2)
where gn stands for (lump-sum) grants from the upper tier of government.5
Maximization of (1) subject to (2) leads jurisdiction n to select the optimal tax
rate-spending pair (τ∗n, z∗n) as a function of the assumed exogenous variables gn
and in:
τ∗n =
1
1 + ρn
µ
1− ρn
gn
in
¶
(3)
z∗n = gn + τ∗nin =
1
1 + ρn
(gn + in) (4)
Equations (3) and (4) generate the standard neoclassical and somewhat un-
comfortable result that exogenous perturbations in in or gn should be predicted
to have an identical effect on z∗n:
∂z∗n
∂gn =
∂z∗n
∂in =
1
1+ρn
. When this does not
5 It is usually convenient to interpret all monetary variables in (2) as measured in per
capita terms, thus implying that publicly provided services entering the welfare function (1)
are private (rival) in nature, and to ignore the revenue-raising effort and public good provision
on the part of the upper level of government.
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happen, and in particular if a change in grants turns out in practice to provoke
a much larger reaction in local public spending than a change in own resources
does, a flypaper effect is said to exist (Hines and Thaler [20]).
Consider now the consequences of the introduction of a nationwide tax rate
limitation:
l ≤ τn ≤ h (5)
Quite straightforwardly, expenditures equal grants plus the maximum amount
of revenues that can be collected locally (gn + hin) if local government n is
against the upper bound h, meaning that authority n would like to tax pri-
vate income more than permitted. Similarly, expenditures equal grants plus the
minimum amount of revenues that have to be collected locally (gn + lin) if local
government n is against the lower bound l, meaning that it would like to tax
private income less than permitted. As formally shown in Appendix A, this
implies the following:
Proposition 1 Consider the constrained optimization problem given by (1), (2)
and (5). Whether the upper or the lower tax rate limit binds, the sensitivity of
local public spending to grants in the constrained optimum is 1. The sensitivity
of local public spending to own resources in the constrained optimum equals the
binding tax rate limit.
In the above circumstances, the so-called flypaper effect is the result of tax
limitations, and arises irrespective of whether a lower limit (i.e., local authorities
wishing to tax less than permitted) or an upper tax limit (i.e., local authorities
wishing to tax more than permitted) binds. Moreover, since “constrained” local
public expenditures should be predicted - and generally tend - to respond one-
for-one both when grants increase and when they decrease (Stine [36], Hines
and Thaler [20], Gamkhar and Oates [15], Brooks and Phillips [7]), the flypaper
effect label seems an inappropriate or even misleading one: the long studied
anomalous response to intergovernmental grants appears to be best described
as an excess sensitivity (Flavin [14]), and cannot in general be interpreted as a
symptom of local government overspending.
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2.2 The multiple-tax case
Let now lower-tier government n rely onM ≥ 2 distinct own tax revenue sources
as well as on upper-tier government lump-sum grants. Denoting by τmn the flat
rate set on tax base m (imn ), the budget constraint and welfare function can be
expressed as:
zn = gn + τ 0nin = gn +
MX
m=1
τmn imn (6)
wn = ln(zn) +
MX
m=1
ρmn ln(imn (1− τmn )) (7)
with ρmn capturing the contribution of tax base m to community n’s social wel-
fare. While we do not wish to make too specific assumptions here, we can think
of theM tax bases as income flows generated within the local community by dif-
ferent assets held by residents (say, land, physical capital, human capital) or as
comprehensive income accruing to distinct groups of residents (e.g., depending
on households’ income brackets or age structure), as long as local governments
can discriminate among those income flows by employing a given set of tax
instruments (τ1n, ..., τMn ).6 Raising revenues from the M−set of available tax
bases leads to a welfare loss that depends in turn on the selected M−vector
of tax rates, with the marginal welfare loss of taxing base m increasing in the
m tax rate.7 The first order conditions for maximization of (7) subject to (6)
require equalization of the marginal welfare contribution of an additional unit
of own tax revenue spent on local public services to the marginal costs of raising
revenues across all tax bases. This results in a vector of optimal tax rates and
expenditure level exhibiting again the standard “communicating” feature, with
private resources and state transfers being fungible.
Let now central government impose the set of tax rate limitations (m =
6A more general model would have the government design a tax schedule T(bn),
where the tax base vector bn=
?
b1n, ..., bMn
?
is arbitrarily correlated with the income vector
in=
?
i1n, ..., iMn
?
, and the latter might not be taxed. As long as in is observed, a welfarist
government would set T so as to offset any variation in bn that is not correlated with in.
7The welfare formulation (7) is compatible with the classic Hettich and Winer [18], [19]
principle of political cost minimization in the presence of M potential tax sources.
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1, ...,M):
lm ≤ τmn ≤ hm (8)
Depending on the size and contribution to welfare of the M tax bases, their
respective tax rates might be observed in left (τmn = lm) or right (τmn = hm)
corner solutions, resulting in a tax mix that can potentially display lower and
upper limits binding at the same time on different tax rates. Consider now the
effect of a grant change on local government spending behavior. As formally
proven in Appendix A, the sensitivity of local public spending to grants in
the constrained optimum turns out to be increasing in the number of tax rate
limits that are binding. Moreover, such sensitivity equals one if all limits bind.
Interestingly, the one-for-one response of spending to grants emerges either when
all upper limits bind or when all lower limits bind, or for any of the admissible
fully constrained tax mix outcomes, with some of the limits binding from above,
and some from below.
To see why this is the case, take the example of a two-tax environment and
a double-sided limit on each tax rate. While representing a very simple case, it
provides the basic intuition and can be generalized to tax rate vectors of any
dimension. Suppose that, conditional on state grants and community tastes
for public services, the local government wishes to set higher tax rates than
the upper limits on both revenue sources. This implies that any subsequent
grant change will leave the government at its upper-constrained tax mix, and
spending will respond to grants one-for-one: any additional transfers will be
spent on public services to get closer to the desired spending level; on the other
hand, there is no way of offsetting a grant reduction by further raising local tax
rates. Suppose now the government is at a lower-constrained tax mix, wishing
to tax both bases less then permitted. In this case too, any grant change will
cause spending to respond one-for-one: additional transfers will have to be
spent, because there is no way of returning them back to taxpayers via lower
taxes; and it cannot be optimal for a lower-constrained government to offset
a marginal grant cut by raising taxes. Finally, consider a tax mix where the
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local government wishes to tax one of the two revenue sources, say j, less than
permitted by the limit, and tax base k more than permitted, thereby hitting
the lower limit for j and the upper limit for k. Consider what effect a shock
to grants would have in that case: the local government would ideally return
any additional grant to j taxpayers via lower taxes, but that is not feasible
since the tax rate on j is already against the lower limit. Moreover, since it is
clearly not desirable to lower the k tax rate that is already below what welfare
maximization requires it to be, the additional grant will be spent on local public
services. Similarly, a fall in grants cannot be offset by further raising the upper-
constrained tax rate k, and neither is it optimal to raise the lower-constrained
tax rate j. Spending will react one-for-one to the grant reduction by falling by
the same amount.
In the general case ofM tax sources, Appendix A shows that tax limits make
the marginal cost of raising own revenues steeper and the response of local public
spending to grants larger by restricting the number of available tax instruments,
eventually degenerating into an infinitely high marginal cost of self-financing and
a one-for-one local public spending reaction to grants when all tax limits bind.
Along a similar line of reasoning, Appendix A shows that in a fully constrained
tax mix, the sensitivity of local public spending to a tax base shock turns out
to equal the lower or upper binding limit, as the intuitive representation in
figure (1.c) suggested. The main predictions from the multiple-tax model are
summarized in the following:
Proposition 2 Consider the constrained optimization problem given by (6), (7)
and (8). The sensitivity of public spending to grants is increasing in the number
of binding rate limits, and equals 1 if all limits bind, irrespective of whether they
bind from above or from below. The sensitivity of local public spending to own
tax bases in a fully constrained tax mix equals the binding tax rate limit.
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3 Empirical implications and econometric ap-
proach
The results in section 2 prompt the estimation of the sensitivity of local public
expenditures to changes in exogenous revenue sources, while allowing for het-
erogeneous responses depending on the degree to which local governments face
financing constraints. In fact, the empirical investigation of the behavior of local
government spending in the presence of tax limitations bears a striking simi-
larity with two well developed lines of research. The first concerns the inquiry
into the role of financing and liquidity constraints in explaining the elasticity of
investment to cash-flow in Q models of the firm (Bond and Meghir [5], Fazzari
et al., [13], Hu and Schiantarelli [21], Kaplan and Zingales [25], Cummins et
al. [10]).8 The second relates to the borrowing constraint interpretation of the
excess sensitivity of private consumption to disposable income in permanent
income/life cycle frameworks (Runkle [34], Zeldes [42], Jappelli et al. [23]).9
In the empirical investment and consumption literatures, the conventional
approach consists in splitting the sample according to an a priori index of fi-
nancing/liquidity constraint (typically related to the dividend payout or liquid
assets to capital stock ratio for firms, and to the asset-income ratio for con-
sumers), and compare the switching regression estimates of the sensitivity of
investment (consumption) to cash flow (income) for the constrained and uncon-
strained subsamples (Fazzari et al. [13], Kaplan and Zingales [25], and Runkle
[34]). Similarly, in order to test on panel data whether the local public spending
response to revenue sources is affected by tax limitations, a time-invariant selec-
tion criterion can be employed to assign authorities to either of two subsamples
based on whether they are consistently constrained (or not constrained) during
8 In their flypaper effect review, Hines and Thaler [20] mentioned the liquidity constraint
explanation of flypaper-like effects in the private sector. However, they did not consider the
possibility that local tax and expenditure limitations might be the root cause of the flypaper
effect.
9Borge and Tovmo [6] test whether liquidity constraints imposed by balanced-budget rules
affect the intertemporal spending behavior of Norwegian local governments, and find that de-
partures from rational forward-looking public consumption smoothing can in part be explained
by financing constraints.
12
the whole period of observation (t = 1, ..., T ):
znt = q0ntβ1 + ζ1n + η1nt if Kn = 1 (9)
znt = q0ntβ0 + ζ0n + η0nt if Kn = 0 (10)
where: q0nt = [gnt i0nt x0nt], and xnt is a vector of local characteristics that can
be thought to affect community n’s preferences for public services, such as so-
cioeconomic and demographic structure, or ideological complexion. ζ1n and ζ
0
n
are jurisdiction-specific effects comprising all time-invariant, unobservable char-
acteristics that might be correlated with qnt, and Kn is the switching indicator.
Clearly, a number of criteria might be employed to code in a binary way the
observed tax mix of authority n in the presence of M constrained tax revenue
sources, leading to different sample splits.10 For the moment, based on the
realizations of the M tax rates, let Kn be somewhat arbitrarily defined as:
Kn =
½
1
0
if
all tax limits bind
otherwise
(11)
According to the sample separation criterion (11), parameter vector β1 in
equation (9) measures the response by authorities that are structurally con-
strained, in the sense that tax limitations are binding for all revenue sources
and in all years, while β0 in equation (10) captures the response of spending
by authorities that are not, in the sense that at least one of their M tax rates
does not hit the limits. The theoretical prediction on the size of the grant co-
efficient in particular is: β1g = 1 > β
0
g. Authorities in the Kn = 1 regime would
necessarily exhibit a one-for-one response to transfers, not being able either to
return increased grant money back to residents via tax cuts, or to raise taxes
to offset a fall in state transfers, irrespective of whether lower or upper limits
bind. As for the effect of tax base changes, fully constrained authorities would
have β1mi = hm (β
1m
i = lm) when an upper (lower) tax limit is binding on
tax base m. On the other hand, authorities in the Kn = 0 regime would be
able to transfer any extra grant back to their own taxpayers by reducing the
10 In principle, finer partitions than the two-sample split can be constructed according to
the degree to which tax limitations bind.
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unconstrained tax rates; similarly, they would partly offset a grant reduction by
raising their unconstrained local tax rates, meaning that β0g < 1.
The above considerations suggest that the behavior of expenditures in the
Kn = 1 versus Kn = 0 groups ought to be mirrored by changes in theM−vector
of local tax rates. Of course, for all the authorities in the Kn = 1 regime,
∆τmn = 0 by the very definition of the sample separation criterion (11), and this
is actually the force driving spending to follow grants so closely. As regards the
Kn = 0 regime, local governments would raise (lower) tax rates where possible
when grants fall (increase), trying to offset the grantor’s impact on the local
public-private consumption mix. Similarly (as formally shown in Appendix A),
a positive shock to tax base m fosters an increase in tax rate m in an attempt to
re-establish the optimal public-private consumption mix by directing additional
resources to public spending, and a fall in all r 6= m tax rates in order to even
out the marginal costs of raising revenues across tax bases.
A disadvantage of any separation rule inspired by a principle similar to (11),
though, consists in the fact that it implies “freezing” the sample and renouncing
to using information on governments that switch from one regime to the other
over the period of observation (Hu and Schiantarelli [21]).11 An alternative
empirical approach - based, among the others, on Bond and Meghir [5], Jappelli
et al. [23], Zeldes [42] and Cummins et al. [10] - consists in allowing for a
time-varying constraint status as in (12) below, where an authority is rated as
unconstrained in year t (Knt = 0) if it can manoeuvre at least one of its tax
instruments:
Knt =
½
1
0
if
all tax limits bind in year t
otherwise
(12)
However, whether an authority is at a tax mix corner solution in a given
year might in principle be determined endogenously, say if unobserved shocks to
expenditures push local authorities towards the (left or right) tax limits. With
11Moreover, Kn might be correlated with spending. However, since selection effects can
only occur through correlation between Kn and the time-invariant authority-specific effects,
any selection bias is cancelled by differencing them away, and a linear panel data fixed effects
estimator can be applied to the two subsamples (Charlier et al. [9]).
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Knt in equation (12) depending in a structural way on M distinct tax rate
realizations originated from the two-sided constrained optimization problem,
the reduced form of the binary selection index can be expressed in a stochastic
way as a function of the vector of exogenous variables qnt:
Knt = 1 [K∗nt = q0ntδ + µn + εnt > 0] (13)
According to (13), Knt = 1 if K∗nt > 0, K∗nt is an auxiliary latent variable
with no straightforward intrinsic meaning, εnt is normally distributed, and µn is
a time-invariant, authority-specific effect. Upon modelling the selection process
as in (13), it is possible to apply the Wooldridge [40] two-stage procedure for
fixed effects panel data, with the selection equation (13) being consistently esti-
mated in the first stage, and the spending equation for Knt = 1 being estimated
in the second stage after correcting for selection bias.12
4 Local tax limitations in Italy
I analyze the local public spending and tax setting behavior of the Italian
provinces by using panel data through the years 2000 to 2007, i.e., during
the fiscal consolidation process following Italy’s adherence to the EU Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact. The Italian system of local government is organized as a
three-tier structure, with the 103 provinces constituting the intermediate level
between regional (20 regions) and municipal (over 8,000 municipalities) tiers.
Provinces have responsibility mainly in the areas of education (maintenance
and repair of schools and office buildings), road cleaning and maintenance in
non-metropolitan areas, environmental protection in terms of measurement and
monitoring of air and water pollution, waste dumps and sewage systems, and
finally in planning, coordinating and providing technical support to municipal-
ities’ policies.
Over 34 of current provincial expenditure is funded by grants from upper
levels of government (state and regions).13 State grants are either specific or
12The Wooldridge [40] procedure is discussed in detail in Revelli [32].
13A small fraction of grants - less than 1% for most provinces - is funded by the EU.
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general, the latter aiming at equalizing inter-provincial structural differences in
spending needs and fiscal capacity. Provinces are divided into two demographic
bands based on a 400, 000 resident population threshold, and grants are com-
puted according to band-average service cost indices and tax bases. In principle,
state support only concerns a number of mandated provincial functions, while
expenditures on non-mandated services must be entirely funded by own rev-
enues. In practice, the presence of a number of distinct state grant programs
and the complexity of the distribution rules tend to make the overall amount of
grants the outcome of state-province bargaining.14 On the other hand, regional
grants typically finance specific functions that were devolved to the provinces
during the decentralization reform started in the late 1990s. While the devo-
lution process follows nationwide rules, the regions have a considerable degree
of discretion in the delegation of functions to the provinces as well as in the
quantification of the resulting spending needs.
The rest of current spending is funded by three own tax revenue sources: the
vehicle registration tax, the electricity consumption tax, and the waste manage-
ment tax. The vehicle registration tax represents over 50% of own tax revenues.
All brand new vehicles and used vehicles in case of change of ownership are
liable to the payment of the tax the first time they are registered in a provincial
archive under a given owner’s name.15 As shown in table 1, central govern-
ment establishes a lower and an upper bound on the vehicle tax parameters
that provinces can set, with the upper bound corresponding to a 20% higher
tax burden (raised to 30% in 2007) than the one corresponding to the lower
bound. Consequently, the decision of each province consists in determining
autonomously the surcharge rate τv. Second, the electricity consumption tax
is applied by provinces on business uses of electricity. As shown in table 1,
provinces set a tax rate τe between a statewide lower limit of 0.093 and an
upper limit of 0.114 Euro per kWh. Electricity tax revenues make around 13
14The grant endogeneity issue is dealt with in section 6 below.
15The total tax due is made of a lump-sum amount plus a variable component that is related
to the size, power and destination of the vehicle.
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of total own tax revenues. Finally, the waste management tax is a surcharge
applied by provinces on the waste collection bill charged by the municipalities
located in the province on all households and businesses. Table 1 shows that
the surcharge τw must lie between 1% and 5% of the municipal levy. Revenues
from the waste management tax amount to less than 20% of total provincial
own tax revenues.
Table 2 reports the number of authorities hitting lower and upper limits
respectively, the latter showing a considerable increase along the fiscal consol-
idation process, while table 3 rates the authority-year observations based on
how severely they are affected by the tax limitations.16 More than half of the
observations in the dataset (416 out of 720) correspond to fully bound instances,
with all available tax sources being set at left or right corners, while in only 9
observations none of the constraints is binding. For about 40% of the observa-
tions either one or two tax limitations are binding. Interestingly, in over 13 of
the observed tax mix outcomes one lower and one upper limit are binding at
the same time. In terms of the theoretical model of section 2, and while we can-
not accurately measure the vector of income flows upon which the welfare of a
community depends, it seems indeed plausible that the costs of raising revenues
across the three available provincial tax sources are different. Taxes on busi-
ness uses of energy, vehicle registrations and waste service consumption tend
to have an heterogeneous impact on business income depending on firms’ sec-
tor of activity and factor input mix (large versus small, energy-intensive versus
labor-intensive), as well as on the business versus household sector in general,
or on wealthy versus poor households. This implies that different tax vectors
will likely generate different welfare losses and degrees of political opposition to
taxation, thus explaining the diversity of observed tax mix outcomes and the
lack of fungibility between alternative tax revenue sources.
16The data refer to the 90 provinces (out of 103) for which all information from 2000 to
2007 is available.
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5 Empirical implementation
5.1 Time-invariant sample separation
The sample is first split based on a time-invariant indicator Kn that equals
1 if province n is constrained on all own tax revenue sources for the entire
period of observation, and equals 0 if the authority is never observed to have
all constraints binding. Application of the splitting criterion (11) yields Kn = 1
for 24 provincial authorities, and Kn = 0 for 20 authorities in the 2001-2006
period, the rest of the observations being discarded (to be used later on) because
of changing regime during the period. This leaves us with 264 observations.17
Of the 24 structurally capped authorities, 17 were at the upper bounds on all
three own tax rates for the entire period, five were hitting two upper bounds
and one lower bound, one was at one upper and two lower bounds, and one
province was consistently at the three lower bounds. On the other hand, the
authorities in the Kn = 0 regime have one to two binding constraints.
We first estimate the switching regression model (9)-(10)-(11) as a single
equation, with Kn working as a switcher, thus allowing us to test the difference
between the β0 and β1 coefficient vectors:
znt = q0ntβ0+Kn×q0nt(β1−β0)+ζ0n+η0nt+Knt×
£
(ζ1n + η1nt)− (ζ0n + η0nt)
¤
(14)
where znt equals current spending per capita in real terms, and the vector of
explanatory variables qnt includes grants per capita (all current financial trans-
fers from upper levels of government), proxies for private income flows in the
province (tax base indicators for the three own provincial revenue sources and
provincial gross domestic product at market prices), and a set of provincial char-
acteristics: population size to control for economies of scale in service provision;
demographic composition of the resident population (share of the population
aged 0 to 4 years and aged over 65 years); a binary election year indicator to
17 In order to preserve the size of the Kn = 1 sample, it seems sensible to exclude for now
the last year in the sample because of the vehicle tax cap relaxation that occurred in 2007
(from 20% to 30%). Similarly, the first year (2000) is excluded since several provinces became
consistently capped from the year 2001 on.
18
allow for opportunistic policy manoeuvring prior to elections;18 and a right-
wing control dummy to capture a partisan cleavage in spending policy between
right-wing and left-wing governments.
As for tax bases, since official figures are not formally reported either by
provincial governments or by the Ministry, they need to be recollected from
other sources. The national motorvehicle registry system (PRA, Pubblico Reg-
istro Automobilistico) publishes annual data for all new vehicle registrations by
province, and the electricity grid company (TERNA, Rete Elettrica Nazionale)
releases yearly data on domestic and business electricity use by province. As for
provincial surcharges on municipal waste collection bills, average city waste col-
lection tax payments are available from the national statistics institute (ISTAT,
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica). In fact, while constituting reasonable proxies
for the level of resources available within provinces, none of those measures ac-
curately reflects the actual tax bases. First, the nationwide vehicle registration
tax on which provinces set the 0-20% surcharge is based on a non-linear formula
related to the type, engine power and destination of the vehicle. I take the total
number of registered vehicles in a province and transform it into a monetary
tax base by multiplying it by the average baseline registration tax payment. As
for electricity, the available total business consumption data do not equal the
actual tax bases because large energy-intensive plants exceeding 300,000 kWh
consumption per month are exempt from the provincial charge, meaning that we
will overstate the tax base in provinces where larger plants are located. Finally,
municipal waste collection tax payments are available for provinces’ main cities
only, and actual provincial surcharge revenues tend to differ from theoretical
revenues because of endemic low compliance.
The fixed effects estimation results of equation (14) are reported in table 4,
while table 5 reports the separate estimation results of equations (9) and (10) for
the two subsamples. All equations include year dummies. Descriptive statistics
18Provincial elections take place every five years with direct election of the president. The
election schedule is asymmetric, meaning that provinces hold elections at different points in
time.
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and data sources for all variables are reported in Appendix B. Interestingly, all
authorities exhibit what would be termed a flypaper effect according to conven-
tional criteria in the literature. The results in tables 4 and 5 show that the grant
effect is large and highly statistically significant. In fact, the Kn = 0 subsample
is far from being unconstrained in practice, given that it groups authorities that
are indeed against one or two tax limits. However, the results also show that
authorities that are fully constrained react to grants to a significantly larger
extent, actually on a one-for-one basis. The estimate of the effect of grants on
spending is around 0.7 for the moderately constrained subsample (columns (4.2),
(4.4) and (4.6) in table 4; columns (5.2), (5.4) and (5.6) in table 5), while the
coefficient estimate virtually equals 1 for structurally bound provinces (columns
(5.1), (5.3) and (5.5) in table 5). The difference among the two coefficients
(over 0.2) is highly statistically significant. The large and significant difference
in the response to grants in the two subsamples is robust to the introduction
of various controls, none of which - including provincial GDP and demographic
and political characteristics - contributes much to further explaining the pat-
tern of spending. In particular, the estimated coefficients on the own tax bases
all have the expected positive sign and generally plausible magnitudes that are
compatible with the statutory tax rate admissible range, though they are hardly
statistically significant.
5.2 The behavior of tax rates
The theoretical model of section 2 suggests that the one-for-one sensitivity of
fully constrained authorities’ expenditures to grants arises from the fact that
they cannot manoeuvre their own tax rates in an attempt to offset changes in
transfers. The difference that emerges above as far as non-fully constrained
authorities are concerned ought then to be due to their ability to purposefully
use their tax policy to smooth out expenditures in front of year to year changes
in state transfers. In fact, the authorities in the Kn = 0 sample changed their
tax rates pretty frequently during the period, with over thirty tax rate increases
over the 2001-2006 years. Interestingly, grants to those authorities fell by around
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10% in real terms between 2001 and 2006. I can therefore investigate here if
those tax rate changes can be explained as offsetting responses of own revenue
raising policy to widespread state retrenchment.
I take the provincial tax rates as the dependent variables and estimate the
impact of grants and tax bases on the Kn = 0 sample, while controlling for a set
of local characteristics as well as year and province fixed effects. The results are
reported in table 6. With the only exception of the waste management tax rate
in column (6.3), whose grant coefficient is estimated imprecisely, grants turn out
to have a strong negative impact on own provincial tax rates, as suggested by the
theoretical model (equation (27) in Appendix A). The fiscal policy changes ob-
served over the decade seem therefore to be interpretable as offsetting responses
to changes in state policy, suggesting that state retrenchment was responsible
for the secular upward shift in provincial tax rates documented in table 2.19
The estimated coefficients on the provincial tax bases are more mixed. Ve-
hicle registration and business electricity tax bases have insignificant effects on
their respective and cross tax rates, while the waste management surcharge rate
appears to be negatively affected by the municipal waste management charge
base. The latter effect might seem at odds with the theoretical results in Appen-
dix A, that predict positive effects of tax bases on respective tax rates (equation
(30)). However, an increase in the municipal waste charge revenues on which
provinces apply their own surcharge actually amounts to a fall in residents’ dis-
posable income, and is likely to raise the marginal cost for provinces of collecting
further revenues from the waste management bill - a sort of negative fiscal ex-
ternality arising from tax base co-occupation by municipalities and provinces
(Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002). In fact, the results in table 6 suggest that an
higher cost of raising revenues from the waste management surcharge twists in-
stead the provincial tax mix towards increased reliance on business electricity
taxes.
19Similar results (negative and significant impact of grants on vehicle and electricity tax
rates, and no effect on waste management tax rate) emerge when estimating the tax rate
equations on the unbalanced panel of 304 moderately constrained observations of table 3.
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5.3 Time-varying sample separation
Table 7 reports the estimation results of the spending determination model
based on the time-varying index (12). I first use all available sample observa-
tions (as summarized in tables 2 and 3), and estimate a single equation that al-
lows for interaction terms depending on the corresponding tax mix of provincial
authorities, and a unique set of authority fixed effects. Column (7.1) presents
the estimation results when pooling all observations irrespective of their tax
mix. The estimated coefficient on grants is around 0.8, roughly the same figure
as in table 4. The vehicle registration and electricity consumption tax base
coefficients are significant, and their sizes are compatible with the statutory
tax limits (reported in table 1), while that on the waste management base is
virtually zero, again a similar result as in the restricted sample of table 4.
The second column in table 7 shows the estimation results when grants are
interacted with the dummy Knt as defined in (12). It turns out that authori-
ties in the Knt = 1 regime - where all limits are binding - have a significantly
higher sensitivity to grants than authorities that can manoeuvre at least one
revenue source. However, the difference in behavior between the two regimes is
considerably smaller than in the time-invariant sample split: fully constrained
authorities’ expenditures are only estimated to have a 5% higher response to
grants (standard error = 0.02) than non-fully constrained ones. This might be
due to some of the two-limit authorities actually being pretty close to a fully
constrained regime, and basically mimicking the behavior of fully-bound au-
thorities. In order to verify if that is the case, and to further test whether the
sensitivity of spending to grants actually increases with the number of bind-
ing limits, I partition observations into three groups: three binding constraints
(Knt = 1), two binding constraints (K(2)nt = 1) and one or no binding con-
straint, the latter constituting the reference group. I then interact these group
dummies with the grant variable, and estimate the equation with year and au-
thority fixed effects in columns (7.3) and (7.4). In this case, it turns out that
public expenditures in localities where two or three limits are binding are sig-
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nificantly more sensitive to grants than where one or no limit binds, and the
difference is around 0.2, a similar figure as in the time-invariant sample split of
table 4. On the other hand, there seems to be no significant difference between
authorities that have two or three binding rate limits.
In columns (7.5) and (7.6), I proceed to a finer partition of the dataset in
order to investigate if the specific features of the tax mix affect the response of
provincial expenditures to grants. In particular, I test for different responses of
authorities with an (hv, he, hw) tax mix relative to those that are indeed fully
constrained, but are against at least one lower bound: in most instances, the
lower bound refers to the electricity tax, though there are cases (as shown in
table 3) of binding lower constraints for vehicle and waste management taxes
too. Of course, the theoretical model predicts that fully constrained authorities
should exhibit a one-for-one response to grants, irrespective of whether they are
hitting upper or lower bounds. The results in columns (7.5) and (7.6) suggest
that all authorities in a fully constrained tax mix have a very large response -
almost one-for-one - to grants, while it does not make any difference whether
they are against upper or lower bounds.
In table 8, I present the estimation results of an expenditure determination
equation that focuses on fully constrained authorities, with the aim of verifying
whether those authorities respond differently to changes in tax bases depending
on the specific features of their constrained tax mix. In fact, their expenditures’
response to tax bases should differ according to whether they are at lower or
upper bounds, with the estimated coefficients equaling the respective binding
tax rates (as shown by equations (32) and (33) in Appendix A). In order to
have an as focused test as possible, I take the sample of the 238 observations
at an (hv, he, hw) tax mix, and the sample of 130 observations with (hv, le, hw),
the only tax mix difference among the two samples being that the former is
upper-constrained on energy, and the latter is lower-constrained, as shown in
table 3. These are the two most frequent tax mix outcomes in the dataset.
Table 8 first reports estimates of the spending equation when pooling the two
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samples in a single equation (columns (8.1) and (8.2)). The next two columns
allow for heterogeneous effects from grants and energy tax bases by introducing
interaction terms via a dummy that equals 1 if the observation corresponds to a
fully upper-constrained tax mix.20 The results in the pooled sample of columns
(8.1) and (8.2) show that the grant coefficient estimate is above 0.9. Energy
and vehicle registration tax bases have positive significant effects on spending,
and the estimated coefficients are within (vehicle tax) or close to (energy tax)
the range of admissible rates. The energy tax base coefficient is in fact slightly
below the lower bound of 0.093. The vehicle tax coefficient estimate is about
half as it could be expected to be given that all authorities in the sample are
at the 0.20 cap. The waste management tax base has no significant impact, a
result in line with the evidence presented above and likely attributable to the
poor measurement of the waste management tax base. Among the controls that
are added along with tax bases in column (8.2), only provincial income shows
some small positive effect.
When allowing for heterogeneous responses as in columns (8.3) and (8.4),
there is no evidence of significant differences among the two samples in their
sensitivity to grants. Even when constrained at the lower energy tax limit,
local authorities react to grants on an almost one-for-one basis. Authorities at
the lower energy bound have a grant coefficient of 0.95, an even higher point
estimate than the one obtained for fully upper capped authorities, though the
difference among the two coefficients is not statistically significant. As for the
estimated response of spending to the energy tax base, it turns out to be higher
and significantly so when the upper limit he binds than when the lower limit
le binds. Though somewhat stretched, the magnitude of the difference between
the estimated energy tax base coefficients - 0.08 for lower-constrained authorities
and 0.14 for upper-constrained in column (8.3); 0.07 and 0.13 respectively in
column (8.4) - is compatible with the statutory limits.
20No further significant differences emerge when allowing for heterogeneous effects from the
other tax bases or control variables.
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6 Endogeneity issues
One might wonder at this point whether the high sensitivity of local spending to
grants - an almost one-for-one response for fully constrained authorities - is in
fact determined by spurious correlation between expenditures and transfers due
to omitted variables driving both.21 In the context we deal with here, shocks
to provincial expenditures - due, say, to natural disasters or major infrastruc-
ture works - might simultaneously boost state grants to tackle rising spending
needs, and induce local authorities to raise own taxes up to the rate limits. I
tackle these endogeneity issues in the next two sections. First, in section 6.1 I
exploit the institutional features of the Italian multi-tiered structure of govern-
ment, and adopt an instrumental variables approach relying on within-province
grant variability due to changes in variables that can be plausibly thought to
have no independent effect on provincial spending. Second, I explicitly model
endogenous selection into the fully constrained regime in section 6.2.
6.1 Discontinuity, ideology, and advocacy
As argued in section 4 above, a fraction of state general grants is distributed to
provinces according to a formula where localities are split into two demographic
bands (≷ 400, 000 inhabitants) in recognition of the specific features that tend to
be typical of larger, metropolitan provinces relative to smaller, rural ones. The
two-band system creates a discontinuity at the 400, 000 population threshold,
with provinces happening to cross the threshold facing a different reference
group against which their spending needs are evaluated.22 We therefore build a
dummy variable equaling 1 if the population of a province exceeds the threshold
in a given year, and use it as an instrument for grants.
21Recent research actually finds little evidence of a flypaper effect when grant endogeneity
arising from a number of sources is explicitly and properly accounted for (Knight [27], Gordon
[16], Lutz [28]).
22The argument is similar to Gordon [16] and Dahlberg et al. [11]. Gordon [16] exploits the
infrequent updating of poverty data used in the US federal education grants to school districts
(Title I), and uses a purely Census-determined grant change measure as an instrument for
actual Title I revenue change. Dahlberg et al. [11] make use of a discontinuity in the grant
formula for municipalities in Sweden, where localities with a net out-migration rate above a
state-set threshold are entitled to extra grants.
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Second, a far from negligible share of grants to the provinces (over 13) come
from the regions, and are intended to fund specific administrative functions
that the latter delegate to the former. While the delegation process abides to
general national rules, the regions have a substantial degree of discretion in
implementing and quantifying it, and it seems reasonable to allow the ideology
of the regional governments to affect their policy design towards the provinces.
In particular, based on the idea that the political complexion of the regional
government might affect the size of grants flowing down to the provinces located
within the region, while not directly influencing provincial expenditures, we use
a right-wing regional government dummy as an instrument for grants.23
Finally, in spite of the undisputed national parliament supremacy in the
Italian multi-tiered government structure, all laws concerning subnational ad-
ministrative or financial issues, including local public service organization, man-
agement and financing, need to be preliminarily discussed in a state-local gov-
ernments committee before final approval.24 The committee was established
in 1996 to foster dialogue and cooperation between central and local govern-
ments. It can make recommendations, submit proposals or require amendments
to state acts to be discussed in parliament. Besides central government represen-
tatives (typically the Finance, Regions, Infrastructures and Interior Ministers),
the committee is composed of 14 representatives from the municipalities and 7
representatives from the provinces, and meets regularly during the year.25 The
province representatives in the committee include the president of the national
union of the Italian provinces26 (that is normally elected every five years among
the province presidents) and six province presidents that are nominated by the
union itself and sit in the committee for five years (unless they decade earlier
from office). Province delegates tend to reflect the demographic (large metropol-
itan versus small rural), political (right-wing versus left-wing) and geographic
23Arulampalam et al. [2] and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro [35] show that alignment with
grantors and vote swing can affect the size of grants. However, this does not appear to be the
case as far as Italian provinces are concerned.
24Conferenza stato-città enti locali (www.conferenzastatocitta.it).
25A parallel committee exists for state-regions issues (Conferenza stato-regioni ).
26U.P.I., Unione delle Province d’Italia (www.upinet.it).
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(North, South and Centre) diversity of the province universe.27 In practice, the
union criteria for selecting its representatives in the state-local committee are
hard to decipher, and plausibly seem to follow some crude rotation principle. Of
course, and similarly to US state congressional delegations (Knight [27]), sitting
in the state-local governments committee can enhance the “political power” of
delegates to advocate their home province needs and interests. In the light of the
virtually random process of committee member selection, we build an advocacy
dummy variable equaling 1 if the president of a province sits in the state-local
governments committee in a given year, and use it as an instrument for grants.
The instrumental variables estimation results are reported in table 9. I focus
here on the sample of authorities that are observed to switch from one tax mix
regime to the other over the panel length. This allows me to test both the
effect of grants on spending behavior conditional on observed tax mix regimes
(table 9), and subsequently on the probability that an authority moves into a
fully constrained tax mix (table 10). After excluding provinces that are never
observed to hit all tax limits, as well as those that are observed in the Knt = 1
or Knt = 0 regime for less than two years, I end up with a balanced panel of
40 “switching” provinces over the eight years 2000-2007, with 188 observations
in Knt = 1 and 132 observations in Knt = 0. Importantly, since I aim at
estimating the response of authority n’s spending to grants in year t provided
that authority n stays on the same portion of its budget constraint, i.e., it does
not jump to a different segment of its kinky budget constraint by, say, raising a
tax rate from a lower to an upper limit, I require the tax mix of authority n in
year t to be identical as in year t−1 in order for that observation to be selected
into the Knt = 1 regime (Bond and Meghir [5]).28
Column (9.1) reports OLS estimates of the spending equation on the whole
27Over the years, the commitee included delegates from huge metropolitan provinces (Milan
and Rome, with around 4 million inhabitants) as well as small ones such as Brindisi in the
South (<400,000 inhabitants), Trieste in the North-East (<250,000) and Rieti in the Centre
(<150,000).
28This implies that I cannot exploit here the changes in the Knt selection index that are
generated by the exogenous vehicle tax rate cap relaxation that occurred nationwide in the
last sample year.
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sample of 40 switching provinces for comparison. The first stage results of the
2SLS approach are reported in the second column and reveal that two of the
three instruments discussed above play a significant role in explaining grants.
The population threshold dummy has no significant effect, though: this is likely
due to the fact that only a tiny fraction of provinces actually crosses the 400, 000
threshold in the period considered. Moreover, since provinces tend to approach
the population threshold towards the later sample years, the effects in terms
of grant entitlements are likely to be observed after the end of the observation
period. As far as the other instruments are concerned, provinces turn out to
receive less grants when the regional government is from a right-wing coalition:
switching from an extravagant left-wing regional government to a thrifty right-
wing one is estimated to lead to a fall in grants to provinces located within the
region of over 10% on average. On the other hand, it turns out that sitting
in the state-local government committee indeed attracts significant additional
resources to a province: on average, gaining a seat in the committee amounts to
an almost 20% boost in grants to a province. Overall, the three instruments are
valid and jointly significant in the first stage whether or not the other exogenous
regressors are included, with an F test of over 11 in panel 9A, and over 14 in
panel 9B.
The second stage results are reported in column (9.3) for the whole sample,
and in columns (9.4) and (9.5) for the fully constrained and moderately con-
strained samples respectively. When instrumented, the grant coefficient falls
modestly in the overall sample, while remaining pretty close to 1 under the
Knt = 1 regime. The gap among the estimates of the expenditure sensitivity
to grants in the two regimes remains at around 0.2. Overall, allowing for en-
dogeneity of grants still delivers an impressively high estimate of the spending
sensitivity to grants in the Knt = 0 subsample (β0g > 0.7), suggesting that bind-
ing tax limits might not be the sole source of excess sensitivity of local public
expenditure to grants.
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6.2 Endogenous selection
As far as the issue of endogenous selection into the Knt = 1 regime is con-
cerned, table 10 reports the estimation results of the Wooldridge [40] two-stage
approach. In order to focus on the forces pushing local authorities towards the
upper tax rate limits, I perform the Wooldridge procedure on the 27 local au-
thorities that: a) were not fully constrained for at least two periods, meaning
that they could manoeuvre at least one of their own revenue sources, and: b)
switched at some point to the fully upper-constrained regime (hv, he, hw) and
were observed there for at least two periods. Probit estimation of the first-stage
binary selection equation (13) - column (10.1) - reveals that grant policy indeed
played an important role in driving selection into the fully upper-constrained
regime: the effect of grants on the probability of being in a (hv, he, hw) tax mix
is negative and highly statistically significant. On the other hand, as far as the
stochastic component of equation (13) is concerned, the second stage estima-
tion results suggest that the selection process can be considered exogenous with
respect to the local public spending pattern. The Wooldridge [40] variable ad-
dition test reported at the bottom of table 10 is far from statistical significance,
and column (10.2) reveals that performing the Wooldridge [40] correction has
a negligible impact on the estimation results, including in particular the excess
sensitivity of local public spending to grants.
Finally, as argued above, one might believe that treating grants as exogenous
in the selection equation be illegitimate, due to the possibility of shocks (say, a
plant relocation) driving local authorities to corner solutions and simultaneously
soliciting grants from upper level governments. In order to test whether this is
the case, I regress grants on the three instruments discussed in section 6.1 (as
well as all other exogenous variables in equation (13)) and include the residuals
from that estimation in equation (13). The t statistic of the estimated coefficient
on the residuals is a test of grant exogeneity in the selection equation (Rivers
and Vuong [33]). The t statistic of the estimated coefficient on the residuals
from the grant equation takes on the value of around 1 (p value of about 0.3),
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suggesting that grants can legitimately be treated as exogenous in the selection
equation.
7 Concluding remarks
By explicitly incorporating the corner solutions that are typically produced by
statewide limitations on local tax rates, this paper has modelled the local tax
mix determination process, and demonstrated that the so-called flypaper effect
arises in the constrained tax mix. In particular, the paper has shown that local
expenditures should be predicted to display a one-for-one response to grants in
the presence of binding limitations on all local tax revenue sources. Interestingly,
the above result holds when either upper or lower tax limitations are in place,
and it turns out that a binding limitation on just one of the available own revenue
sources is enough to generate a sort of excess sensitivity of local spending to
grants. Moreover, such excess sensitivity should be expected to arise - and
generally tends to manifest itself - both when grants increase and when they
decrease. On the other hand, the response of public spending to a shock to a
local tax base whose rate is constrained turns out to be a function of the (lower
or upper) binding rate limit.
The key empirical predictions of the model in terms of local public spending
and tax rate sensitivity to grants and own tax bases have been tested on panel
data on the Italian provinces through the years 2000s. The Italian provinces’
data allow us to exploit the sharp corner solutions generated by central gov-
ernment upper and lower limitations on own sources of tax revenue (a tax on
vehicle registrations, a tax on electricity consumption for business uses, and
a waste management surcharge). I have employed a switching regression ap-
proach where local authorities are assigned to either of two subsamples based
on the intensity to which central tax limits bind, and estimated the response
of local public expenditures to grants and own tax bases in the two subsam-
ples. Whether the sample is split according to a time-invariant criterion or to a
time-varying one, the empirical evidence consistently suggests that the reaction
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of local spending to grants is significantly higher - actually, one-for-one - for
fully constrained authorities than for authorities that can manoeuvre at least
one of the local tax instruments. Those results turn out to be robust when
endogenous selection into the constrained sample is controlled for, and when
we allow grants to be determined endogenously. In particular, we employ a
set of powerful institutionally-driven instruments related to exogenous disconti-
nuities in the grant distribution formula, ideological complexion of upper level
(regional) governments, and political power of province delegates sitting in the
state-local governments advisory committee. While the results on the response
of local public expenditures to own tax bases are less clear-cut, they generally
provide a coherent picture of provincial expenditures being tied to the evolu-
tion of local resources via the binding upper or lower tax rates. Finally, the
empirical evidence on the negative effect of grants on local tax rates for author-
ities that are not fully constrained provides support to the view that the fiscal
policy changes observed over the decade can indeed be interpreted as offsetting
responses to changes in state policy in a period of retrenchment, while fully
constrained authorities sort of mechanically react to grants one-for-one.
Overall, the results in this paper suggest that statewide limitations on local
governments’ tax policies - or, more generally, the ample role of diverse forms
of central command, including tax base assessment, general revenue limitation,
and local public service mandates - ought not to be ignored when investigating
the extent to which central funding crowds out local tax effort, and when in-
terpreting the empirical evidence on local government response to state grants.
In particular, the empirical phenomenon that has been documented for decades
and has been conventionally - and somewhat incorrectly - interpreted as arising
from stickiness of federal transfers (the so-called flypaper effect) seems instead
to be best described as an excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants
that cannot in general be taken as a symptom of decentralized government
overspending.
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Appendix A: Model
The one-tax case
Consider an unconstrained government with welfare function (1), budget con-
straint (2), and optimal spending and tax rate given by equations (3) and (4)
respectively. Straightforward derivation of (3) and (4) shows that the effects of
gn and in on τ∗n and z∗n are respectively:
∂τ∗n
∂gn
= − ρn
1 + ρn
1
in
< 0 (15)
∂τ∗n
∂in
=
ρn
1 + ρn
gn
i2n
> 0 (16)
∂z∗n
∂gn
=
∂z∗n
∂in
=
1
1 + ρn
> 0 (17)
Consider now the constrained optimization problem given by (1), (2) and (5).
Letting λ0 =
h
λh λl
i
≥ 0 be the vector of Lagrange multipliers, the Lagrangian
function is:
L(τn,λ) = wn + λh(h− τn) + λl(−l + τn) (18)
and the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: ∂L(τn,λ)∂τn = 0, ∇λL(τn,λ) ≥ 0,
λ∇λL(τn,λ) = 0. Trivially, the optimal level of spending equals z∗n(h) =
gn + hin if local government n is against the upper bound h (λh > 0; λl = 0),
and z∗n(l) = gn + lin if it is against the lower bound l (λ
l > 0; λh = 0). With
τ∗n stuck at either the lower or the upper limit, the effects of gn and in on z∗n
are easily found as:
∂z∗n(h)
∂gn
=
∂z∗n(l)
∂gn
= 1 (19)
∂z∗n(h)
∂in
= h (20)
∂z∗n(l)
∂in
= l (21)
Whether the upper or the lower tax rate limit in (5) binds, the sensitivity of
local public spending to grants in the constrained optimum is 1. The sensitivity
of local public spending to own resources in the constrained optimum equals the
binding tax rate limit.
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The multiple-tax case
Consider the constrained optimization problem given by (7), (6) and (8). Letting
λ0 =
h
λh1 ... λhM λl1 ... λlM
i
≥ 0 be the vector of Lagrange multipliers, the
Lagrangian function is:
L(τn,λ) = wn +
MX
m=1
λhm(hm − τmn ) +
MX
m=1
λlm(−lm + τmn ) (22)
and the necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: ∇τL(τn,λ) = 0, ∇λL(τn,λ) ≥
0, λ∇λL(τn,λ) = 0. Denoting by Ln ≡
³
τmn |λlm > 0
´
andHn ≡
³
τmn |λhm > 0
´
the sets of tax rates hitting the lower and upper bounds respectively, and
by Un ≡
³
τmn |λlm = λhm = 0
´
the set of tax rates lying strictly between the
bounds, the constrained tax rate mix (m = 1, ....M) is:
τm∗n (l,h) =



lm m ∈ Ln
hm if m ∈ Hn
ψn



1 +
P
r∈Un
r 6=m
ρrn

− ρ
m
n
imn
Γn

 m ∈ Un
(23)
where: l0 =
£
l1, ..., lM
¤
, h0 =
£
h1, ..., hM
¤
, and:
ψn ≡
1
1 +
P
r∈Un
ρrn
(24)
Γn ≡ gn +
P
r∈Un
r 6=m
irn +
P
r∈Ln
lrirn +
P
r∈Hn
hrirn (25)
From (23) and (6), the level of spending in the constrained optimum is:
z∗n(l,h) = ψn
Ã
gn +
P
m∈Un
imn +
P
m∈Ln
lmimn +
P
m∈Hn
hmimn
!
(26)
gn and irn are easily found to have the following effects on τm∗n (m ∈ Un) and
z∗n:
∂τm∗n
∂gn
=
∂τm∗n
∂irn
= −ψn
ρmn
imn
< 0 if r ∈ Un (27)
∂τm∗n
∂irn
= −ψn
ρmn
imn
lr < 0 if r ∈ Ln (28)
∂τm∗n
∂irn
= −ψn
ρmn
imn
hr < 0 if r ∈ Hn (29)
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∂τm∗n
∂imn
= ψn
ρmn
(imn )
2Γn > 0 (30)
∂z∗n
∂gn
=
∂z∗n
∂irn
= ψn > 0 if r ∈ Un (31)
∂z∗n
∂irn
= lrψn > 0 if r ∈ Ln (32)
∂z∗n
∂irn
= hrψn > 0 if r ∈ Hn (33)
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Appendix B: Data description
Table A1 Variables used in the analysis: descriptive statistics
obs. mean s.d. min max
Vehicle registration tax rate (%) 720 17.7 7.2 0 30
Electricity consumption tax rate (€ per kWh) 720 0.104 0.010 0.093 0.114
Waste management tax rate (%) 720 4.5 1.1 1 5
Vehicle registration tax base per capita (€) 720 154.3 46.4 51.9 359.1
Electricity consumption tax base per capita (kWh) 720 122.1 35.9 53.4 279.0
Waste management tax base per capita (€) 720 219.9 89.9 37.4 516.6
Income (GDP per capita ,000 €) 720 20.2 5.1 9.5 34.1
Population (,000) 720 567.9 631.6 89.0 4061.5
Aged 0-4 share 720 4.4 0.6 3.0 6.3
Aged 65+ share 720 20.4 3.1 12.0 27.5
Real current spending per capita (€) 720 146.1 46.1 56.9 291.9
Real grants per capita (€) 720 118.2 44.7 36.6 249.0
Election year (%) 720 15.4
Right-wing control (%): province 720 33.6
Right-wing control (%): region 136 50.4
Table A2 Variables used in the analysis: data sources
Data source
Vehicle registration tax rate & base Automobile Club Italy - PRA
Electricity consumption tax rate Italian Government, Ministry of Finance
Electricity tax base Terna Rete Elettrica Nazionale
Waste management tax rate Italian Government, Home Office
Current spending Italian Government, Home Office
Grants Italian Government, Home Office
Election year Italian Government, Home Office
Right-wing control Italian Government, Home Office
Income National Statistics Institute
Population & demographics National Statistics Institute
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Table 1 Lower and upper tax rate limits
2000-6 2007
Vehicle registration tax rate τv lv 0 0
(% surcharge on national rate) hv 20 30
Electricity consumption tax rate τe le 0.093 0.093
(Euro per kWh) he 0.114 0.114
Waste management tax rate τw lw 1 1
(% surcharge on municipal levy) hw 5 5
Table 2 Number of authorities (N = 90) at lower (l) and upper (h) limits
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
τv lv 25 15 9 7 7 5 4 3
hv 55 65 71 72 73 77 79 43
τe le 66 54 43 37 34 27 18 15
he 16 29 39 45 47 52 59 64
τw lw 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3
hw 66 64 66 65 65 66 66 68
Table 3 Tax limitation intensity
Fully constrained total
(h,h,h) (h,h,l) (h,l,l) (l,l,l)
τv hv hv hv lv hv lv lv lv
τe he he le he le he le le
τw hw lw hw hw lw lw hw lw
obs. 238 6 130 0 3 0 28 11 416
Moderately constrained
(h,h) (h,l) (l,l)
τv hv hv τv∗ hv lv hv lv τv∗ τv∗ lv lv τv∗
τe he τe∗ he le he τ e∗ τ e∗ he le le τe∗ le
τw τw∗ hw hw τw∗ τw∗ lw hw lw hw τw∗ lw lw
obs. 61 60 27 36 3 0 0 1 39 32 0 0
(h) (l)
τv hv τv∗ τv∗ lv τv∗ τv∗ τv∗
τe τe∗ he τe∗ τ e∗ le τ e∗ τ e∗
τw τw∗ τw∗ hw τw∗ τw∗ lw τw∗
obs. 1 15 4 1 15 0 9 304
720
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Table 4 Time-invariant splitting criterion (Kn)
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6)
grants
0.844~
(0.035)
0.722~
(0.046)
0.838~
(0.034)
0.744~
(0.047)
0.843~
(0.035)
0.759~
(0.051)
Kn× grants 0.253
~
(0.069)
0.205~
(0.070)
0.200~
(0.074)
tax basev
0.203~
(0.060)
0.224~
(0.088)
0.215~
(0.065)
0.183∗
(0.098)
tax basee
0.057
(0.054)
0.096
(0.084)
0.058
(0.056)
0.049
(0.092)
tax basew
0.024
(0.015)
0.019
(0.020)
0.023
(0.015)
0.016
(0.020)
income
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
population
-0.088
(0.077)
-0.227
(0.134)
age 0-4 share
0.561
(6.412)
-2.965
(7.784)
age 65+ share
-3.272
(3.334)
-2.992
(5.226)
election
-0.634
(1.333)
-0.664
(1.775)
right-wing
2.375
(2.823)
6.627
(6.615)
observations 264 264 264 264 264 264
authorities 44 44 44 44 44 44
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed province
and year effects included; year effects interacted with the switching indicator Kn
in columns (4.2), (4.4) and (4.6); exogenous variables interacted with the switching
indicator Kn in columns (4.4) and (4.6); Kn defined in equation (11). Standard errors
in parentheses. ~ : p-value < 0.01; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
41
Table 5 Time-invariant splitting criterion: separate equations
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)
Kn= 1 Kn= 0 Kn= 1 Kn= 0 Kn= 1 Kn= 0
grants
0.975~
(0.048)
0.722~
(0.050)
0.949~
(0.049)
0.744~
(0.050)
0.959~
(0.051)
0.759~
(0.055)
tax basev
0.121
(0.079)
0.224∗
(0.095)
0.133
(0.091)
0.183∗
(0.105)
tax basee
0.025
(0.064)
0.096
(0.091)
0.036
(0.068)
0.049
(0.099)
tax basew
0.036∗
(0.021)
0.018
(0.021)
0.037∗
(0.022)
0.016
(0.022)
income
0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
population
-0.032
(0.101)
-0.227
(0.144)
age 0-4 share
9.940
(10.434)
-2.965
(8.400)
age 65+ share
0.959
(4.599)
-2.992
(5.639)
election
-0.172
(1.962)
-0.664
(1.915)
right-wing
1.089
(2.993)
6.627
(7.247)
observations 144 120 144 120 144 120
authorities 24 20 24 20 24 20
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed province and
year effects included. Kn defined in equation (11). Standard errors in parentheses. ~ :
p-value < 0.01; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Table 6 Tax rates
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6)
τv τe τw τv τ e τw
grants
-0.070~
(0.028)
-0.008~
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.066∗
(0.032)
-0.009~
(0.003)
-0.005∗
(0.003)
tax basev
-0.013
(0.061)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.013~
(0.005)
tax basee
0.097
(0.057)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.005)
tax basew
-0.004
(0.013)
0.004~
(0.001)
-0.004~
(0.001)
income
0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
population
-0.071
(0.085)
-0.013
(0.008)
-0.013∗
(0.007)
age 0-4 share
1.074
(2.173)
0.001
(0.212)
0.228
(0.176)
age 65+ share
-1.096
(1.424)
0.013
(0.139)
-0.050
(0.115)
election
0.889
(1.113)
-0.035
(0.108)
0.033
(0.090)
right-wing
2.292
(4.041)
-0.883∗
(0.393)
-0.015
(0.327)
observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
authorities 20 20 20 20 20 20
Notes: Dependent variable: tax rates on vehicle registrations, electricity use and
waste management charge. Fixed province and year effects included. Standard errors
in parentheses. ~ : p-value < 0.01; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Table 7 Time-varying splitting criterion
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6)
grants
0.864~
(0.016)
0.834~
(0.020)
0.686~
(0.037)
0.683~
(0.038)
0.686~
(0.037)
0.683~
(0.038)
Knt× grants 0.051
~
(0.020)
0.203~
(0.038)
0.210~
(0.039)
0.205~
(0.040)
0.211~
(0.041)
K(2)nt× grants
0.162~
(0.035)
0.170~
(0.035)
0.162~
(0.035)
0.170~
(0.035)
K(h, h, h, )nt× grants
-0.003
(0.025)
-0.003
(0.025)
tax basev
0.057∗
(0.030)
0.055∗
(0.030)
0.066∗
(0.030)
0.068∗
(0.033)
0.065∗
(0.030)
0.067∗
(0.033)
tax basee
0.101~
(0.032)
0.103~
(0.032)
0.107~
(0.031)
0.109~
(0.033)
0.109~
(0.032)
0.111~
(0.034)
tax basew
-0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.004
(0.008)
0.007
(0.008)
0.004
(0.008)
0.007
(0.008)
income
0.001∗
(0.000)
0.001∗
(0.000)
population
0.027
(0.019)
0.027
(0.019)
age 0-4 share
1.566
(3.003)
1.502
(3.012)
age 65+ share
-1.920
(1.515)
-1.942
(1.520)
election
0.911
(0.952)
0.926
(0.956)
right-wing
1.173
(1.748)
1.146
(1.753)
observations 720 720 720 720 720 720
authorities 90 90 90 90 90 90
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed province and
year effects included. Knt defined in equation (12); K(2)nt = 1 if two constraints
bind in year t; K(h, h, h)nt = 1 if three upper constraints bind in year t. Standard
errors in parentheses. ~ : p-value < 0.01; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Table 8 Time-varying splitting criterion: upper vs. lower constraints
(8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4)
grants
0.936~
(0.020)
0.944~
(0.020)
0.947~
(0.025)
0.950~
(0.026)
D(he)nt× grants
-0.013
(0.026)
-0.010
(0.026)
tax basev
0.099∗
(0.042)
0.113∗
(0.046)
0.104∗
(0.043)
0.107∗
(0.047)
tax basew
0.017
(0.012)
0.020
(0.012)
0.016
(0.012)
0.019
(0.012)
tax basee
0.084∗
(0.039)
0.088∗
(0.042)
0.084∗
(0.041)
0.075∗
(0.046)
D(he)nt× tax basee
0.059∗
(0.031)
0.057∗
(0.034)
income
0.002∗
(0.001)
0.002∗
(0.001)
population
-0.005
(0.038)
-0.006
(0.038)
age 0-4 share
4.799
(4.421)
1.475
(4.729)
age 65+ share
-1.560
(2.036)
-2.077
(2.053)
election
0.445
(1.255)
0.404
(1.258)
right-wing
2.925
(2.125)
2.671
(2.152)
observations 368 368 368 368
authorities 63 63 63 63
Notes: Dependent variable: real current spending per capita. Fixed province and
year effects included. Knt defined in equation (12); D(he)nt = 1 if upper limit on
electricity tax is binding in year t. Standard errors in parentheses. ~ : p-value < 0.01;
∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Table 9 Grant endogeneity: IV approach
(9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5)
OLS 2SLS: first stage 2SLS: second stage
Knt= 1 Knt= 0
Panel 9A
grants
0.945~
(0.020)
0.926~
(0.059)
0.949~
(0.069)
0.750~
(0.163)
Instruments:
discontinuity
-12.127
(11.690)
ideology
-16.750~
(3.789)
advocacy
24.163~
(6.789)
F(3, 270) test 11.42
(p value) (0.00)
χ2(2) overid. test 2.50
(p value) (0.29)
Panel 9B
grants
0.931~
(0.020)
0.947~
(0.055)
0.951~
(0.075)
0.797~
(0.178)
Instruments:
discontinuity
0.259
(11.802)
ideology
-18.372~
(3.796)
advocacy
29.538~
(6.691)
F(3, 261) test 14.32
(p value) (0.00)
χ2(2) overid. test 1.39
(p value) (0.49)
observations 320 320 320 188 132
authorities 40 40 40 40 40
Notes: Fixed province and year effects included. Panel 9A: exogenous regressors
not included; Panel 9B: exogenous regressors included. Knt defined in equation (12).
Standard errors in parentheses. ~ : p-value < 0.01; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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Table 10 Wooldridge two-stage approach (Knt = 1)
(10.1) (10.2)
First stage: Knt Second stage: znt
Probit (balanced) Wooldridge correction
grants
-0.017~
(0.007)
0.956~
(0.035)
tax basev
0.004
(0.013)
0.172∗
(0.070)
tax basew
-0.002
(0.003)
0.010
(0.017)
tax basee
-0.011
(0.009)
0.074∗
(0.030)
income
0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
population
0.006
(0.022)
-0.203
(0.122)
age 0-4 share
-1.123
(1.244)
1.167
(8.375)
age 65+ share
0.789
(0.628)
0.856
(3.836)
election
-1.063∗
(0.543)
1.758
(1.950)
right-wing
0.879
(0.896)
4.048
(3.140)
Wooldridge t test -1.12
(p value) (0.79)
observations 216 147
authorities 27 27
Notes: Knt defined in equation (12). Standard errors in parentheses. ~ : p-value
< 0.01; ∗: p-value < 0.10.
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48
